IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGMENT INITIATIVE DECISION (MID) 913 -BACKGROUND AND IMPACT WITHIN DOD
The Department's current planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition systems are rigid, unresponsive and ill-suited for a dynamic and uncertain security environment. DoD needs to streamline and integrate Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the major acquisition and requirements processes with particular attention paid to those areas where technological change occurs most rapidly.
Defense Planning Guidance Fiscal Years (FYs) [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] On 22 May, 2003, the Department of Defense (DoD) approved the implementation of a two-year Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE). This improved PPBE process is expected to revolutionize internal DoD budget efforts, increase effectiveness and add additional emphasis to execution. The changes come as a result of Deputy Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz direction to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) to study and recommend improvements to the overall DoD decision-making processes. 1 Management Initiative Decision (MID) 913 is a product which came out of the SEC study.
MID 913 implements interim initiatives to increase the effectiveness of the programming and budgeting process and add additional emphasis to execution. 2 MID 913 adds additional focus on the execution process. DefenseLink says the purpose of the new process will be to:
Evolve from an annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission (BES) cycle, to a biennial (two-year) cycle starting with an abbreviated review and amendment cycle for FY 2005. The Department will formulate two-year budgets and use the off-year to focus on fiscal execution and program performance. The two-year cycle will guide the Department's strategy development, identification of needs for military capabilities, program planning, resource estimation and allocation, acquisition, and other decision processes. This change will more closely align DoD's internal cycle with external requirements embedded in status and administration policy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will continue to serve as the Department's major statement of defense strategy and business policy. It also will be the single link throughout DoD that integrates and influences all internal decision processes.
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PURPOSE
In that light, this strategy paper will provide insights into the history, timeline, phases, assessment, and recommendations for the MID 913 process.
The analysis and feedback from data collected will show DoD still has shortfalls with offsets, combatant commands (COCOMS) Title 10 Executive Agency (EA) support, and discipline in controlling program and budget change proposals. I will offer recommendations to reduce these shortfalls. Additionally, I will recommend areas where DoD should not change.
HISTORY OF MID 913
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the main phases of PPBS were strictly sequential. In other words, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) came out in early Spring; Services submitted POMs followed by their budgets in September. 9 The key aspects of MID 913 were to revamp the PPBS process, and get DoD back on a two-year budget (budget and execution year) submission cycle. The off-year (defined as the odd-numbered year) will be used to focus on performance of programs within DoD. The on-year or even years (2006, 2008, 2010, etc…) will be the period internal components subordinate to OSD complete and turn in their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BES).
10 Two-year cycles will allow OSD to have a full POM and BES completed during the even-numbered calendar year, while the odd year will be an "adjustment" year.
Adjustments made during the odd year in the program and budget review will be composed of change proposals to the previous year's submission (even year). MID 913 guidance directed the following changes in the PPBE process:
• Two-year cycle which will guide the PPBE process.
• Not introduce major changes in the odd years (2005, 2007, 2009, etc...) .
• Off-year (2005, 2007, 2009, etc…) review focus will be on execution and performance.
• Create a single standardized programming and budgeting system for data collection and management.
• Incorporate metrics and cost models.
• Over time, metrics will become the analytical underpinning to ascertain whether appropriate allocation of resources exists.
• Adjust resources to achieve desired performance goals. • Services dominate the current requirement process
• Service planning does not consider full range of available solutions to meet joint warfighting needs • Resourcing functions focuses senior leadership effort on fixing problems at the end of the process rather than early in the planning process 13 The Aldridge study made key recommendation to the PPBE process. These were:
• Joint needs will form the foundation for the defense program
• Planning for major joint capabilities will be drawn at the Department level vice the component level
• Senior leaders will focus on providing guidance and making decisions in the "front end"
of the process These were (1) offsets and (2) Title 10 executive agency responsibilities. With offsets, the problem can be broken down even further, as the offset problem seen through the lens of the COCOMs and that of the Services.
Offsets. Offsets were the biggest issue and the most painful part of the process. Offsets are resources an organization must provide OSD in exchange for the program they propose to fund (resource trade-offs). Offsets are "zero-sum" in the sense there is no increase in funding from OSD when an organization requests to increase a program. If an organization wishes to increase resources to a program, they must also be willing to give equal resources back to OSD in return. No organization was excited about providing offsets. 19 From experience, the perception exists, that if an organization offers a proposal change, in conjunction with an offset, and the change is disapproved, the offset can be potentially left at risk.
Service offsets -lessons learned
Services were "nervous" about what they offered in exchange for the proposal. Services had the ability to look into their own programs to find "acceptable risk" but not into other Service or Defense-Wide programs. Service components were required to submit a balanced proposal that is for the total package not each BCP. Services were allowed to cross appropriations as well. Many programs had offsets/enhancements spread across multiple PCPs and BCPs.
PCPs were not mutually exclusive and some programs required examination across many PCPs/BCPs. 20 Difficulty existed in balancing Service and OSD databases under the current system. Because the program and budget review cycles were completed in only three months, the time to analyze the offsets was shortened. As a result, analysis of the actual acceptance of the offset for the BCP or PCP was short, leaving a greater degree of risk than in the past (when the program and budget review process were separate and distinct).
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Combatant Command (COCOM) offsets -lessons learned COCOMs had limited visibility to look at other COCOMs or Services for offset proposals.
A large percentage of the combatant command's total obligation authority is non-discretionary.
In other words, about 70% of the warfighting headquarters has little room to move funds around.
Most of the COCOM fixed costs each year go to base operations support, with little room to propose a change. The funds that can get moved are typically tied to key programs which are essential for the warfighter e.g. Intelligence programs. Many of the COCOM programs which are non-discretionary, cannot be cut too much or the program will be terminated. There is just not much wiggle room for change proposals in a COCOM. The few offsets submitted by combatant commands were submitted knowing they were unrealistic but "needed to get something on the Evaluation are reviewing the same requirement, since the process goes quickly, and the change proposals are not properly scrubbed. DoD anticipated a very small density of change proposal submissions since the intent of these adjustments was to make slight changes due to fact-oflife realities. 24 DoD was bombarded with over 300 PCP (over 60 from the COCOMs) and BCPs that normally would have been Service POM adjustments. 25 In the end, $35 billion was made in adjustments in the FY '05 review. 26 More latitude should be given to Services to adjust funding (minimal changes) inside of programs just as they would do in a POM year. Tracking over 300 BCPs and thousands of pages of PCPs and BCPs resulted in over $30B worth of churn, similar to a regular budget year.
Both the OUSD(C) and OUSD(PA&E) analysts admit they couldn't effectively track all the impacts across the programmatic spectrum. Process rules need to be adhered to and enforced.
The process rules should be enforced. Many proposals were submitted with either no offset or unacceptable offsets yet the enhancements were deemed as important and continued to be worked as issues. 31 The DoD guidance said that change proposals will be zero-sum or submitted with an offset. This did not occur in all cases, so there is a process foul in the system. When organizations do not have to provide an offset, someone else will be directed to pay the offset. Resolution of PCPs seemed to take a very long time and disposition of many issues was not forthcoming. This caused confusion on Joint Staff and among combatant commands about status of issues. Even OUSD(PA&E) staff couldn't identify what was happening to specific issues.
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Vet programs through Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS).
Recommend DoD components vet program starts/enhancements through JCIDs prior to PCP submission. Many DoD offices used PCP submission as the "start" to program builds vice the final stages of the process. As a result, many PCPs were ill-defined, poorly priced, and inappropriately offset. Using the joint process would better integrate, shape, and incorporate these issues upfront and would lesson controversy during program review. 
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POMs still completed in off-year.
The off-year does not require a POM submission by the Services, yet the Army will say the only way to achieve the necessary standard is to build a full POM in the off-year. 36 Even DoD acknowledges a review of the complete POM is necessary to really submit valid PCPs.
DoD guidance too restrictive .
DoD sent out very restricted technical guidance to Service, COCOM and Defense-Wide Agencies. 37 This guidance directed the Services not to submit a database to them, instead, they were to only submit change proposals. As a result, lots of time was spent educating both sides (DoD and the Services) on the change packages.
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Last minute changes.
Too many "last minute" non-concurrences provided unnecessary turbulence in the process resulting in multiple (and unnecessary) 3-Star reviews for the same issue. If dissention is timelier, PCPs could be approved quicker in the process and revisited less often. 39 The BCP/PBD process was disjointed, received less analysis/discussion and resulted in larger bills to the services.
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PCP and BCP submission conflicts.
In several cases the program and budget review conflicted or hindered progress.
Proposal submission dates were 60 days apart between PCP and BCP, yet disposition could not be determined until much later in the process. Several COCOMs were held in limbo waiting for disposition on PCPs and resubmitted their issues as BCPs.
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COCOMS almost universally believe they did not get a fair shake in this process. They feel their Service EAs did not fund their requirements and none of them got everything they asked. They were happy they got FY '05 changes approved, but did not understand, (even after being told numerous times) that '04 money was going to be extremely hard to come by. 42 What the combatant commands wanted was current year money or year of execution money.
LESSON LEARNED WHICH WENT WELL -FY 2005 -2009 PROCESS
• Several of the PCPs (15) were quickly referred to budget review before the BCP submission date, making a clear separation as to the review process for those issues.
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• The announcement of major meetings and dissemination of information worked well.
Products were available for multiple staff reviews and decisions made after much input and consideration of the enhancements and offsets.
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• The zero-sum PDM prevented last minute programmatic decisions. As a result, upfront negotiations between DoD and the Services provided more informed and agreeable funding positions.
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• PCPs provided satisfactory "decision packages" at the appropriate programmatic level for issue teams and senior leaders to evaluate program enhancements against program offsets (risks).
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• The DoD screening process weeded out most poorly defined PCPs. Roughly 66 percent of the submitted PCPs were not approved for further review.
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• Making all DoD components (other than just the Services) submit PCPs ensured that "good ideas" were accompanied by appropriate offsets (risks). This limited risk to current validated programs.
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• Increased interaction between DoD program and comptroller offices and the Services encouraged more informed decisions.
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• Allowing subject matter experts to attend the 3-Star Review sessions ensured more factual and accurate discussion.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
An important perspective which came out of the Joint Assessment Capabilities Study sums up why the PPBE process is difficult from a centralized viewpoint:
Because the Services receive more program guidance than they can resource, they are forced to make their own tradeoff judgments to comply with fiscal constraints. Service needs compete with joint needs, with tough choices required to create a fiscally responsible program. Service decisions are made in their own best interests and are then second guessed by the COCOMs, Joint Staff, and DoD and are often overturned during program review. This has resulted in an annual "train wreck" during program review. The train wreck occurs because joint needs are forced into the process after each Service has developed its own integrated system. The resulting budget does not optimize capabilities at either the Department or the Service level. The effort to modify the program and budget late in the process is labor intensive and adversarial. Offsets will always be contentious. The perception by the components is their own administration has a double standard. How can we expect the program and budget process to be fair when our subordinate units do not trust submitting their offsets, knowing they are placing this offset at risk, if the change proposal is not accepted.
One of the best things about the whole process is the Services really do not end up getting too much friction in their POM/BES or change requests. Only slight adjustments are really done by DoD (usually 3 percent or less).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Some of the key points:
• Focus on joint capabilities
• Ensure that joint capabilities are developed and born joint, rather than forced into jointness late in their development • Give COCOM commanders a key role in shaping the defense program
• Place emphasis on strategy and planning
• Impose fiscal discipline early in the process
• Avert December "train wrecks"
• Create feedback mechanism 52 Many of our DoD change proposals are a result of our wartime commitments. The DoD baseline budget does not include these shortfalls. The global war on terrorism is ongoing and there are no plans to stop this initiative in the near future. Services, COCOMs, and DefenseWide Agencies must be adamant about scrubbing their requirements before their POM/BES submissions, to ensure they have captured all critical requirements. DoD currently includes many of our contingency costs (like Bosnia and Kosovo) in their baseline budget. There is discussion that DoD will begin to include Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Department's budget in a few years, but not now. Without inclusion of known wartime costs, DoD will continue to get a large influx of program and budget change proposals. This can be done with increased awareness of valid DoD requirements. Both program and budget guidance must be more direct to include wartime all known valid requirements.
